The economic consequences of major tax cuts for the rich by Hope, David & Limberg, Julian
	
	
				 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The Economic Consequences of Major 
Tax Cuts for the Rich 
  
David Hope, Julian Limberg 
Working Paper 55 
December 2020 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
III Working Paper 55                                                             Hope, Limberg 
2 
	
	
 
LSE International Inequalities Institute 
The International Inequalities Institute (III) based at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE) aims to be the world’s leading centre for interdisciplinary research on 
inequalities and create real impact through policy solutions that tackle the issue.  The Institute 
provides a genuinely interdisciplinary forum unlike any other, bringing together expertise from 
across the School and drawing on the thinking of experts from every continent across the 
globe to produce high quality research and innovation in the field of inequalities. 
In addition to our working papers series all these publications are available to download free 
from our website: www.lse.ac.uk/III  
For further information on the work of the Institute, please contact the Institute Manager, Liza 
Ryan at e.ryan@lse.ac.uk  
International Inequalities Institute 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London 
WC2A 2AE 
Email: Inequalities.institute@lse.ac.uk  
Web site: www.lse.ac.uk/III  
 @LSEInequalities 
© David Hope and Julian Limberg. All rights reserved.  
 
	  
III Working Paper 55                                                             Hope, Limberg 
3 
	
	
 
Abstract 
This paper uses data from 18 OECD countries over the last five decades to estimate the 
causal effect of major tax cuts for the rich on income inequality, economic growth, and un-
employment. First, we use a new encompassing measure of taxes on the rich to identify in-
stances of major reductions in tax progressivity. Then, we look at the causal effect of these 
episodes on economic outcomes by applying a nonparametric generalization of the differ-
ence-in-differences indicator that implements Mahalanobis matching in panel data analysis. 
We find that major reforms reducing taxes on the rich lead to higher income inequality as 
measured by the top 1% share of pre-tax national income. The effect remains stable in the 
medium term. In contrast, such reforms do not have any significant effect on economic growth 
and unemployment. 
Keywords: Tax cuts for the rich, income inequality, growth, unemployment, difference-in-
differences, Mahalanobis matching 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a resurgence in academic research on income inequality, driven by 
the influential body of work by Piketty and co-authors charting the evolution of top incomes 
in the advanced economies over the course of the 20th century (Alvaredo et al., 2013; 
Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014). A central finding from that literature is that while top 
incomes fell for several decades after the Second World War, they turned a corner and began 
rising, most dramatically in the Anglo–Saxon economies, from the 1980s onwards (Alvaredo 
et al., 2013; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007). Correlational evidence from cross-country panel 
studies has found that lower taxes on the rich, especially top marginal income tax rates, are 
strongly associated with rising top incomes over this period (Huber et al., 2019; Piketty et al., 
2014; Roine et al., 2009; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). Although, studies exploring the effects of 
individual tax reforms paint a less clear picture, with some finding persistent effects on income 
inequality (Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020) and others only short-term effects (Saez, 
2017). 
Proponents of tax cuts for the rich often argue for their beneficial effects on economic 
performance. In fact, this line of reasoning, focusing on efficiency gains and the reduction of 
behavioural distortions, was central to the arguments made for major tax reforms in the US 
(Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997; Bartels, 2005; Gale and Samwick, 2017). There are few 
empirical studies exploring the relationship between taxes on the rich and economic 
performance, however, and the evidence we do have is mixed. While some cross-country 
empirical studies find higher top marginal income tax rates and tax progressivity adversely 
affect economic growth (Gemmell et al., 2014; Padovano and Galli, 2002), a number of other 
studies find no significant association (Angelopoulos et al., 2007; Lee and Gordon, 2005; 
Piketty et al., 2014). 
Given the lack of consensus in existing studies and the difficulties of drawing causal 
conclusions from macro-level panel data analyses, it remains an open empirical question 
how cutting taxes on the rich affects economic outcomes. In this paper, we use data from 18 
OECD countries covering the last fifty years to investigate the effects of major tax cuts for the 
rich on income inequality, economic growth, and unemployment. We contribute to the existing 
empirical literature in two ways: first, we use a newly constructed, comprehensive measure 
of taxes on the rich to identify years in which major tax cuts occurred across a wide range of 
advanced economies; and second, we move beyond correlational evidence on the economic 
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effects of taxing the rich by applying a novel matching method that allows for the estimation 
of causal effects from time-series cross-sectional data. 
Our approach to identify major tax cuts utilises a newly constructed indicator of taxes on the 
rich (Hope and Limberg, 2020). The indicator was developed using Bayesian latent variable 
analyses covering a wide range of taxes and indicators, which allows for the comparison of 
taxes on the rich across countries and over time. We code major tax cuts as years in which 
the index fell by over 2 standard deviations. Across our sample of 18 OECD countries from 
1965 to 2015, this provides us with 30 country-year observations where taxes on the rich 
were significantly reduced. 
Our empirical identification strategy relies on our binary variable for major tax cuts for the 
rich, which permits us to apply a nonparametric generalization of the difference-in-differences 
indicator for panel data analysis (Imai et al., 2020). The technique uses Mahalanobis 
matching to compare treated and untreated units that have similar treatment histories and 
pre-treatment covariate trajectories. Furthermore, the methodology allows for explicit checks 
of covariate balance. We use this approach to estimate the causal effect of major reductions 
in taxes on the rich on income inequality, economic growth and unemployment. We obtain 
estimates of the cumulative effects for up to half a decade after the reform, so can also assess 
the extent to which effects persist over time. 
Our results show that, for both matching methods, major tax cuts for the rich increase the top 
1% share of pre-tax national income in the years following the reform (𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + 5). The 
magnitude of the effect is sizeable; on average, each major reform leads to a rise in top 1% 
share of pre-tax national income of 0.8 percentage points. The results also show that 
economic performance, as measured by real GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, is 
not significantly affected by major tax cuts for the rich. The estimated effects for these 
variables are statistically indistinguishable from zero, and this finding holds in both the short 
and medium run. 
Our findings align closely with the existing correlational evidence showing that tax cuts for 
the rich are associated with rising top income shares (Atkinson and Leigh, 2013; Huber et al., 
2019; Piketty et al., 2014; Roine et al., 2009; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). We make an important 
contribution to this literature, however, as our empirical strategy allows for the estimation of 
causal effects. This is particularly pertinent in this case, as there is a large political science 
literature on the power of rich voters and organised business interests to shape public policies 
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(incl. tax policies) in their favour (Bartels, 2009; Emmenegger and Marx, 2019; Gilens, 2005; 
Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Svallfors, 2016), which suggests reverse causality could be a 
major issue in empirical studies lacking a clear identification strategy. 
Existing causal evidence is limited to one study. Rubolino and Waldenström (2020) utilise the 
synthetic control method and find that three major reductions in top marginal income tax rates 
in Australia, New Zealand, and Norway had lasting and large positive effects on top income 
shares. We build upon this study by identifying major reductions in tax progressivity using a 
more comprehensive measure of taxes on the rich that goes beyond income tax progressivity. 
We also look at all major reductions in taxes on the rich across 18 advanced economies from 
1965 to 2015, which allows us to draw stronger and more generalizable conclusions. 
Our findings on the effects of growth and unemployment provide evidence against supply-
side theories that suggest lower taxes on the rich will induce labour supply responses from 
high-income individuals (more hours of work, more effort etc.) that boost economic activity 
(see standard models of optimal labour income taxation in Piketty and Saez, 2013  and Saez, 
2001). They are, in fact, more in line with recent empirical research showing that income tax 
holidays and windfall gains do not lead individuals to significantly alter the amount they work 
(Akee et al., 2010; Jones and Marinescu, 2018; Martinez et al., 2018). 
Overall, our analysis finds strong evidence that cutting taxes on the rich increases income 
inequality but has no effect on growth or unemployment. We do not directly test mechanisms 
in our analysis, but using a measure of top 1% share of pre-tax national income that includes 
both labour and capital income makes it less likely that tax shifting and avoidance are driving 
the results. Our results are in line with those in Piketty et al. (2014), which suggest that lower 
taxes on the rich encourage high earners to bargain more forcefully to increase their own 
compensation, at the direct expense of those lower down the income distribution. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out our approach for 
identifying major tax cuts for the rich and presents a visualisation of the resulting binary 
variable. Section 3 presents the data, empirical strategy, and results for our analysis of the 
effects of major tax cuts for the rich on income inequality. We turn our attention to the effects 
on growth and unemployment in Section 4, before carrying out a series of robustness tests 
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
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2. Identifying major tax cuts for the rich 
Many empirical studies look at single tax policy indicators to identify tax cuts for the rich. 
However, there is some disagreement on measuring taxes on the rich in the literature. First, 
there is no consensus on which taxes to look at. Whilst some authors look at taxes on 
personal income (Egger et al., 2019; Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020), others focus on 
corporate taxation (Devereux et al., 2002) or inheritance taxation (Piketty and Saez, 2013b). 
Second, economists have used different tax policy indicators. Some look at top marginal 
income tax rates (Piketty et al., 2014), while others look at effective tax rates (Egger et al., 
2019) or revenue generation (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). We propose an encompassing 
approach that utilises Bayesian latent variable analysis on a range of different taxes and 
indicators to overcome these problems. This allows us to detect shared variance across 7 
indicators that are commonly used proxies for taxes on the rich (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix). In total, the data cover 18 OECD democracies over 5 decades (1965-2015). We 
estimate the latent variable using a Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach 
with diffuse normal priors, three MCMC chains and 1000 burnin iterations (for more 
information on the estimation of the latent variable, see Hope and Limberg, 2020). 
Figure 1 shows the development of the taxing the rich indicator in the sample.1 In line with 
other empirical studies that have found substantially declining taxes on the rich in the last 
decades (Egger et al., 2019; Scheve and Stasavage, 2016), the indicator decreases 
substantially from the mid-1980s onwards. From the late 1960s to the end of the 1990s, the 
average value of the latent variable for taxes on the rich across the sample dropped by more 
than 30%. Furthermore, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the indicator steadily 
declined from the late 1960s. This indicates that tax policies on the rich have converged 
among OECD countries over time. 
 
																																								 																				
1 See Figure A1 in the Appendix for country-specific time series. 
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Figure 1. Latent variable for taxes on the rich, 18 OECD countries, 1965-2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Hope and Limberg (2020). 
 
In a second step, we use the latent variable to detect major tax cuts for the rich. We calculate 
country-specific first-differences of the indicator and define major tax cuts as years in which 
the indicator drops by at least 2 standard deviations. Since we are interested in the effects of 
major tax cuts for the rich, this high threshold is in line with our theoretical focus. Furthermore, 
two standard deviation shocks are often employed in the empirical literature in 
macroeconomics (Dell’ Erba et al., 2015; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015) and this size 
threshold is in line with the size of tax and spending changes identified in the literature 
exploring the effects of large fiscal policy adjustments on economic outcomes (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2010; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
Figure 2 visualises the resulting binary variable that picks out years in which taxes on the rich 
were reduced substantially.2 In total, we identify 30 country-year observations where taxes 
on the rich were significantly reduced. Governments enacted major tax reforms in all 
countries in our sample and across the whole observation period. Many countries 
implemented major tax cuts for the rich in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the identification of 
																																								 																				
2 Figure A2 in the Appendix shows how changes in the latent variable translate into the binary variable of major 
tax cuts based on the 2 standard deviations threshold. 
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tax cuts is also in line with previous studies that have focused on income tax progressivity 
(Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020) or on overall tax progressivity single specific countries 
(Saez and Zucman, 2019). For instance, echoing these authors’ findings, we find two major 
reforms that reduced taxes on the rich in the US: 1982 (First Reagan Tax Cut) and 1986/1987 
(Second Reagan Tax Cut). 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of major tax cuts for the rich, 1965-2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
3. The effect on income inequality of major tax cuts for the rich 
Our empirical design leverages variation in tax reform timings to estimate effects of cutting 
taxes on the rich on income inequality. Let us consider classical approaches of estimating 
causal effects for time-series cross-sectional data with 𝑁 countries and 𝑇 years. Up to date, 
most analysis of panel data rely on linear regression techniques with two-way fixed effects 
and control variables. Such models typically take the following form: 
 
𝑌*+ = 𝛼* +	γ+ + 𝛽1𝑋*+ + (𝛽3𝑋3*+)
4
356
+ 𝜀*+ (1) 
 
United	States
United	Kingdom
Sweden
New	Zealand
Italy
Netherlands
Germany
Canada
Australia
Norway
Japan
Finland
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
Switzerland
France
Ireland
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for 𝑖	 = 	1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡	 = 	1, … , 𝑇 and where 𝑌*+ denotes our main outcome variable and in 
country 𝑖 and year 𝑡 and 𝛽1 is the estimated effect of the binary variable 𝑋*+, which measures 
major tax cuts for the rich. 𝛼* is the unobserved time-invariant country-specific effect and γ+ 
is the unobserved year-specific effect. (𝛽3𝑋3*+)4356  denotes a set of 𝐾 time-varying 
covariates and 𝜀*+ is the error term. Using such an approach to estimate the causal impact of 
major tax reforms that cut taxes on the rich on income inequality creates three methodological 
challenges. First, the effect of reforms might vary over time. However, Equation 1 requires 
the researcher to specify a lag of the treatment registration. For instance, Equation 1 would 
estimate the contemporaneous reform effect (𝑡 + 0). Second, related to this, the standard 
approach does not account for previous reform trajectories. Put differently, if 𝛽1 ≠ 0 for 𝑋*,+>?, 
where 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, estimating the effect of tax reforms might run danger of being biased due to 
previous reform trajectories (Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020). Thus, we need to compare 
cases with similar reform trajectories. Third, reforms do not come at random. Instead, political 
and economic factors might make reforms more likely, and these factors can also affect 
subsequent income inequality dynamics. Furthermore, the practice of adding potential 
confounders as covariates like in Equation 1 does not allow for the assessment of covariate 
balance. 
To deal with these challenges to causal identification, we use a new econometric approach 
that implements a nonparametric generalisation of the difference-in-differences indicator for 
panel data analysis (Imai et al., 2020). This technique compares units with a major tax reform 
in a respective year (treated units) with units that have a similar pre-treatment trajectory of 
tax reforms but have not enacted a tax cut in the same year (control units). Furthermore, the 
method allows us to estimate how the treatment effects evolves over time. Most importantly, 
Imai et al. (2020) introduce 𝐹, which denotes the number of years after a tax reform, and 𝐿, 
which denotes the amount of lags prior to the treatment. Specifying 𝐹 allows the researcher 
to estimate varying treatment effects over time. For instance, setting 𝐹 = 5	measures the 
cumulative treatment effect for 5 years after a major tax cut for the rich. In contrast, 𝐿 allows 
the researcher to adjust for treatment histories, e.g. 𝐿 = 5 adjusts for the treatment history up 
5 years prior to the treatment. As a consequence, the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) takes the following form, 
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where countries that experience a major tax cut in year 𝑡 are the treated unit, hence 𝑋*+ = 1 
as well as 𝑋*,+>6 = 0. Hence, 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 1, 	𝑋*,+>6 = 0, 𝑋*,+>ℓHℓ5I  is the potential outcome for 
countries that have enacted a major tax cut and 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 0, 	𝑋*,+>6 = 0, 𝑋*,+>ℓHℓ5I  is the 
counterfactual potential outcome. We are interested in the cumulative effect up to 𝐹 years 
after a tax reform and adjust for treatment histories up to 𝐿	years prior to a tax reform. 
Unfortunately, the counterfactual outcome for treated countries, i.e. 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 0, 	𝑋*,+>6 =
0, 𝑋*,+>ℓ ℓ5I
H |	𝑋*+ = 1, 𝑋*,+>6 = 0, cannot directly be observed. Thus, we have to take 
potential outcome for countries without a major tax cut for the rich instead.  
 
𝛿 𝐹, 𝐿 = 	𝔼 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 1, 	𝑋*,+>6 = 0, 𝑋*,+>ℓ
H
ℓ5I
|	𝑋*+ = 1, 𝑋*,+>6
= 0	 − 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 0, 	𝑋*,+>6 = 0, 𝑋*,+>ℓ
H
ℓ5I
|	𝑋*+ = 0, 𝑋*,+>6 = 0	  
 
(3) 
However, tax cuts are not random. In particular, observed confounders, (𝑋3*+)4356 , as well 
as unobserved confounders can lead to biased results. Thus, we use a difference-in-
differences estimator as well as nonparametric matching techniques for additional time-
varying covariates (Imai et al., 2020 p. 14). Matching is an intuitive and powerful tool to deal 
with selection into treatment (Diamond and Sekhon, 2012; Ho et al., 2007). In contrast to 
adding confounders as covariates like in Equation 1, it is less prone to modelling decisions 
and allows for the assessment of covariate balance. Furthermore, the difference-in-
differences estimator relaxes the unconfoundedness assumption, but crucially assumes a 
parallel trend in the outcome variable after adjusting via matching on the previous treatment 
history, 𝑋*,+>ℓHℓ5I , as well as on the covariate trajectory, (𝑋3*,+>ℓ)4356Hℓ51 . Thus, we need 
to explicitly check whether the parallel trend assumption holds. 
𝛿 𝐹, 𝐿 = 	𝔼 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 1, 	𝑋*,+>6 = 0, 𝑋*,+>ℓ
H
ℓ5I
− 𝑌*,+EF 𝑋*+ = 0, 	𝑋*,+>6 = 0, 𝑋*,+>ℓ
H
ℓ5I
|	𝑋*+ = 1, 𝑋*,+>6 = 0	  
 
(2) 
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We use the block-bootstrap procedure proposed by Imai et al. (2020) to calculate standard 
errors. Following Otsu and Rai (2017) and Imbens and Rubin (2015), this approach 
circumvents the inference problems caused by standard bootstrapping procedures for 
matching by calculating the weight that each observation gets in the matching procedure. 
This weight-variable is used as a conditioning factor and is not recomputed in the 
bootstrapping procedure (Imai et al., 2020, p. 20). 
Our main treatment variable is therefore the presence of a major tax cut for the rich. The 
first dependent variable we look at is income inequality, as measured by the top 1% share of 
pre-tax national income.3 This measure includes both labour and capital income. Data come 
from the World Inequality Database (Alvaredo et al., 2018) and are calculated from 
administrative tax sources using a common methodology, so allow for comparison over time 
and across countries (Atkinson et al., 2011; Roine and Waldenström, 2015). Top income 
shares are also used in many existing studies looking at the relationship between taxes on 
the rich and income inequality (Huber et al., 2019; Piketty et al., 2014; Roine et al., 2009; 
Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). We start by estimating the 
causal effect of major tax cuts for the rich on inequality while solely matching on the treatment 
trajectory. We match units based on a 5-year pre-treatment window (i.e. 𝐿 = 5). Only 1 
observation could not be matched to control units with a similar treatment trajectory (see also, 
Figure A3 in the Appendix). Figure 3 visualises the matching approach by looking at four 
exemplary cases of major tax cuts and the matched-on control groups. 
 
																																								 																				
3 There are some missing data points for top income shares (less than 10% of cases). In these cases, we have 
used an exponentially weighted 5-year moving averages interpolation procedure. 
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Figure 3. Visualisation of the matching approach, using four major tax cuts as 
examples 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4 shows the treatment effect after matching on the previous treatment trajectory. In 
order to differentiate between short- and medium-term effects of tax cuts for the rich, we look 
at the effects for up to 5 years after the reform (i.e. 𝐹 = 5). For each year, the graph displays 
the cumulative treatment effect and 95% confidence intervals. The results show that major 
tax cuts lead to a significant increase in inequality and that this effect becomes stronger with 
time. Three years after the reform, the top 1% income share increases by almost 0.6 
percentage points in countries with a major tax cut. Over five years, tax reforms increase the 
top 1% share of pre-tax national income by more than 0.8 percentage points. This effect is 
highly statistically significant, with P<0.0001. Furthermore, the graph also shows a placebo 
test by estimating the effect of tax cuts in the years before the reform. These placebo models 
test whether there have been significant different trajectories of inequality development in the 
III Working Paper 55                                                             Hope, Limberg 
14 
	
	
countries with and without a major tax cut prior to the reform.4 The point estimates of the 
placebo tests are close to zero and statistically insignificant. In other words, the findings show 
strong support for the parallel trends assumption that underlies the difference-in-differences 
estimator. 
 
Figure 4. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich on top 1% income shares after matching 
on treatment trajectory 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In a second step, we match units with a similar treatment history and with similar covariate 
trajectories. We match on a battery of time-varying covariates, covering economic factors, 
such as real GDP per capita (in 2011 US dollars), capital openness via the Chinn-Ito Index 
(Chinn and Ito, 2006), and trade openness (imports and exports as % of GDP), as well as 
political factors like the vote share of leftist parties and government expenditure (as % of 
GDP). Table A2 in the Appendix shows the different covariates and their data sources. We 
choose a matching approach that is based on the Mahalanobis distance as opposed to 
propensity score matching, as recent studies have found that the latter can be inefficient and 
create model dependency (King and Nielsen, 2019). Similar to the previous analysis, we 
																																								 																				
4 Since the model calculates the first differences in relation to the year before the tax reform (i.e. t-1), the effect 
is 0 for this year. 
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match upon 5-year pre-treatment windows. Importantly, matching on pre-treatment values 
has the advantage that we do not have a problem with post-treatment bias. 
Unlike multivariate regression analysis, the matching approach allows us to assess 
improvements in covariate balance. Figure 5 visualises the covariate balance by comparing 
standardised mean differences of the covariates before and after matching on the 
Mahalanobis distance. Before matching, several variables showed significant imbalance with 
standardised mean differences beyond the commonly accepted threshold of 0.25 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). After matching, the standardised mean differences no longer 
exceed this threshold. 
 
Figure 5. Standardised mean difference of covariates before and after matching 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
When rerunning the difference-in-differences model after matching on both pre-treatment 
treatment trajectories and covariate history, our results hold (Figure 6). Reforms that reduce 
taxes on the rich have a substantial short- and medium-term effect on the top 1% share of 
pre-tax national income. On average, such reforms increase the top 1% income share by 
more than 0.8 percentage points after 5 years. We run placebo tests by estimating the effect 
of major tax reforms on pre-treatment changes in inequality. In line with the previous findings, 
the parallel trend assumption holds. The point estimate for the time periods 4 and 5 years 
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prior to the treatment are negative (around 0.2 percentage points), but fail to reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
 
Figure 6. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich on top 1% income shares after matching 
on treatment trajectory and covariates 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4. The effect on economic growth and unemployment of major tax cuts 
for the rich 
Let us now turn to the effect of major tax cuts for the rich on economic growth and 
unemployment. First, we analyse whether such reforms boost growth by looking at the effect 
on real GDP per capita. In line with other studies, we look at logged real GDP per capita 
(Piketty et al., 2014; Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020). Again, we estimate the ATT by using 
a nonparametric generalisation of the difference-in-differences estimator. Like in the previous 
section, we match upon the treatment trajectory, as well as on an additional battery of 
covariates via the Mahalanobis distance. Models are matched upon 5-year pre-treatment 
windows and we look at the effects of up to 5 years after the tax reform. Again, we use the 
block-bootstrap procedure designed by Imai et al. (2020) to calculate standard errors for 
TSCS matching. 
Figure 7 presents the results. The left panel shows the model without covariates. The 
results suggest that tax reforms do not lead to higher economic growth. The effect size of 
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major tax cuts for the rich on real GDP per capita is close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
The findings are very similar when matching upon pre-treatment covariate trajectories (right 
panel). Major tax cuts for the rich do not lead to higher growth in either the short or medium 
run. Furthermore, we do not find any effect of tax cuts on pre-treatment changes. Thus, the 
parallel trend assumption holds. We also calculated the same model by replacing (log) real 
GDP per capita with the real GDP per capita growth rate. Again, we find no significant effect 
of tax reforms on changes in GDP per capita growth (see Figure A5 in the Appendix). 
 
Figure 7. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich on (log) real GDP per capita after matching 
on treatment trajectory (left panel) and treatment trajectory and covariates (right panel) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Let us now look at the effect of major tax cuts for the rich on unemployment. To ensure cross-
national comparability, we use harmonised unemployment rates as provided by the OECD 
(2020a). Figure 8 shows the results. In general, we see more fluctuation in the estimates. In 
the years right after the tax reform, the point estimate becomes negative. In the medium term, 
the estimate becomes close to zero again. However, none of these estimates is significant at 
the 0.05 level. Furthermore, we can see slight fluctuation in the development of 
unemployment rates prior to the tax reform. Whilst the placebo estimate for the 𝑡 − 5 time 
period is negative, yet statistically insignificant, unemployment grew slightly faster in the year 
prior to the reform. However, these placebo tests do not show indications of a clear pre-
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treatment trend. In sum, although the results show very slight indications of a flash in the pan 
effect of tax cuts for the rich on unemployment, these findings are neither statistically 
significant nor robust. 
 
Figure 8. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich on unemployment rates after matching 
on treatment trajectory (left panel) and treatment trajectory and covariates (right panel) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
We run several alternative specifications to check whether our results are robust. First, we 
apply a lower threshold of 1 standard deviation to detect major tax cuts for the rich. Using a 
1 standard deviation threshold means that we include tax cuts of smaller magnitude. Hence, 
it is a more conservative approach of testing the impact of tax cuts on economic outcomes. 
Figure 9 visualises the effects on inequality, economic development, and unemployment.5 
The findings hold when using this alternative threshold. Cutting taxes for the rich increases 
the top 1% share of pre-tax national income significantly and this effect persists over time. 
The effect size decreases slightly. The new models using the lower threshold estimate that 
tax cuts lead to an increase of top 1% income shares by 0.5 percentage points. The smaller 
effect size is unsurprising given the lower threshold for identifying major reforms. 
																																								 																				
5 Again, all models are calculated with 5-year lags and by matching on the Mahalanobis distance. 
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Furthermore, we find no effect of tax reforms on real GDP per capita. When looking at the 
effect on unemployment rates, the estimates show a slightly different pattern. Here, tax cuts 
for the rich lead to slightly higher unemployment rates in the short term. However, this effect 
does not hold over time either. Hence, it supports our previous finding that the effects of tax 
cuts for the rich on unemployment rates are not robust. 
 
Figure 9. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich, 1 standard deviation threshold for tax 
cuts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Second, we check the robustness of our findings by changing the length of our time lags. So 
far, we have calculated all models with 5-year lags. Choosing longer time lags has the 
advantage that it reduces potential bias from long-term effects of confounders. However, it 
also makes it harder to find suitable matches. Thus, we check our results by running models 
that use 1-year lags. This allows for more variance, but the findings are more vulnerable to 
bias. Figure 10 shows the results. In line with the previous analyses, tax cuts for the rich raise 
top 1% income shares significantly by around 0.7 percentage points in the medium run. In 
contrast, tax reforms do not lead to higher economic growth.6 We find a slightly negative 
short-term effect on unemployment rates (𝑡 + 1). However, this effect disappears in the 
medium run (𝑡 + 2 to 𝑡 + 5). 
 
																																								 																				
6 The fact that this model matches on shorter time windows also leads to larger confidence intervals for the 
placebo tests.  
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Figure 10. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich, 1-year lag 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Third, we use a different matching technique. Instead of matching on the Mahalanobis 
distance, we match on propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Although some 
studies have argued that propensity score matching is based on modelling assumptions and 
might therefore increase bias compared to nonparametric matching procedures (King and 
Nielsen, 2019), it is an intuitive and widely used matching approach (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Figure 11 presents the results when matching on propensity scores.7 The results are 
very similar to our main approach that matches upon the Mahalanobis distance. Whereas tax 
cuts for the rich lead to higher income inequality, they do not have a robust effect on either 
economic growth or unemployment rates. 
 
Figure 11. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich, propensity score matching 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
																																								 																				
7 In line with the main models, we use 5-year lags again. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper uses a two-stage process to estimate the causal effects of major tax cuts for the 
rich on economic outcomes. First, we identify instances of major reductions in tax 
progressivity by looking at substantial falls (greater than 2 standard deviations) in a new, 
comprehensive indicator of taxes on the rich that covers 18 OECD countries from 1965 to 
2015. Second, we apply a nonparametric generalization of the difference-in-differences 
indicator that implements Mahalanobis matching in panel data analysis to estimate the causal 
effect of major tax cuts for the rich on income inequality, economic growth, and 
unemployment. 
We find that major tax cuts for the rich push up income inequality, as measured by the top 
1% share of pre-tax national income. The size of the effect is substantial: on average, each 
major tax cut results in a rise of 0.8 percentage points in top 1% share of pre-tax national 
income. The effect holds in both the short and medium term. Turning our attention to 
economic performance, we find no significant effects of major tax cuts for the rich. More 
specifically, the trajectories of real GDP per capita and the unemployment rate are unaffected 
by significant reductions in taxes on the rich in both the short and medium term. 
Our results have important implications for current debates around the economic 
consequences of taxing the rich, as they provide causal evidence that supports the growing 
pool of evidence from correlational studies that cutting taxes on the rich increases top income 
shares, but has little effect on economic performance (Lee and Gordon, 2005; Piketty et al., 
2014; Roine et al., 2009). They also align with the causal findings in Rubulino and 
Waldenstrom (2020),  but provide stronger and more generalizable conclusions, as our 
approach allows us to move beyond looking at tax changes in only handful of selected 
countries. 
There are several potentially fruitful avenues for future research that come out of our analysis. 
While our choice of dependent variable (including both capital and labour income) makes it 
less likely the results are being driven by tax shifting or avoidance, we do not specifically test 
the mechanisms at work. Follow up research could therefore assess whether the 
macroeconomic effects we find are being driven by the mechanism outlined in Piketty et al. 
(2014), which is that lower taxes on top incomes induce the rich to bargain more aggressively 
to increase their own rewards, to the direct detriment of those lower down the income 
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distribution. The analysis could also be extended outside of the OECD to see if the findings 
hold in countries with lower fiscal capacity. Lastly, from a policy perspective, it would also be 
important to understand more about the extent to which individuals’ attitudes to taxing the 
rich are influenced (or not) by the provision of new information about its economic 
consequences. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1. Indicators and data sources for the Bayesian latent variable analysis 
Tax 
type Indicator Time span  Source 
Income Top personal income tax rate 1965-2015 
Scheve & Stasavage (2016), 
expanded by the authors for 
the years 2011-2015. 
Income Effective tax rate on top 1% wage earners 1980-2007 Egger et al. (2019) 
Income/ 
Capital Top tax rate dividend income 
1981-1999; 
2000-2015 OECD (2020b) 
Capital Corporate income tax rate 1965-2015 
Lierse & Seelkopf (2016), 
expanded by the authors for 
the years 1965-1980 and 
2011-2015. 
Capital Effective tax rate on capital 1965-2015  McDaniel (2007) 
Assets Top inheritance tax rate 1965-2015 
Scheve & Stasavage (2016), 
expanded by the authors for 
the years 2011-2015. 
Assets 
Revenue from taxes on 
assets (inheritance, net 
wealth, and property taxes,  
% of GDP) 
1965-2015 OECD (2020b) 
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Table A2. Covariates and data sources 
Indicator Source 
Top 1% share of pre-tax national income Alvaredo et al. (2018) 
Harmonised unemployment rate (%)  OECD (2020a) 
Real GDP per capita (in 2011 US dollars)  Penn World Table (Feebstra et al., 2015) 
Capital account openness (Chinn–Ito Index) Chinn & Ito (2006) 
Trade openness (imports and exports as % of GDP) IMF (2020) 
Government expenditure (as % of GDP) OECD (2019) 
Left vote share in last election Brady et al. (2020) 
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Figure A1. Latent variable for taxes on the rich, 18 OECD countries, 1965-2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Hope and Limberg (2020). 
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Figure A2. Changes in the latent variable for taxes on the rich and major tax cuts 
 
Note: Country-year observations in red show tax cuts for the rich that exceed the 2 standard deviation threshold. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure A3. Distribution of number of matched control units 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure A4. Distribution of major tax cuts for the rich, 1 standard deviation threshold, 1965-
2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure A5. Effect of major tax cuts for the rich on real GDP per capita growth rates after 
matching on treatment trajectory (left panel) and treatment trajectory and covariates (right 
panel) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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